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Summary 
The cloud has emerged as a successful computing paradigm allowing users and 
organizations to rely on external providers for storing and processing their data and 
making them available to others. An increasing important priority for the wide 
adoption and acceptance of cloud computing is the ability of data owners and users to 
have enforced and assess security guarantees. Guaranteeing security means ensuring 
confidentiality and integrity of data, accesses, and computations on them as well as 
ensuring availability of data and services to legitimate users and in compliance with 
agreements with the providers.  In this chapter, we present an overview of the main 
security issues and concerns arising in the cloud scenario, in particular with respect to 
the storage, management, and processing of data.  
 
1. Introduction 
The rapid advancements in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) have 
enabled the emerging of the “cloud” as a successful paradigm for conveniently 
storing, accessing, processing, and sharing information. With its significant benefits 
of scalability and elasticity, the cloud paradigm has appealed companies as well as 
individuals, which are more and more resorting to the multitude of available providers 
for storing and processing data. Unfortunately, such a convenience comes at the price 
of loss of control of the owners of the data, and consequent security threats, which can 
limit the potential widespread adoption and acceptance of the cloud computing 
paradigm. On one hand, cloud providers can be assumed to employ basic security 
mechanisms for protecting data in storage, processing, and communication, devoting 
resources to ensure security that many individuals and companies may not be able to 
afford. On the other hand, data owners as well as users of the cloud lose control over 
data and their processing.  ENISA lists loss of control and governance as a top risk of 
cloud computing (ENISA, 2009).  The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) lists data 
breaches and data loss as two of the top nine threats in cloud computing (CSA, 2013). 
Security threats can arise because of the new complexity of the cloud scenario (e.g., 
dynamic distribution, virtualization, and multi-tenancy), because data or computations 
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might be sensitive and should be protected even from the providers eyes, or because 
providers might be not fully trustworthy and their - possibly lazy or malicious - 
behavior should be controlled. 
The term cloud encompasses a variety of distributed computing environments, 
varying with respect to the architectural or trust assumptions and the services offered. 
In particular, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
distinguishes four deployment models and three service models (NIST, 2011). The 
deployment models range from a private cloud, where the infrastructure and services 
are operated for a single organization and are maintained on a private network, to a 
public cloud, where the infrastructure is made available to the public and is owned by 
an organization offering cloud services. Ownerships and operation models between 
these two extremes are also possible, such as in a community cloud, where different 
companies with common objectives (e.g., business goals and security requirements) 
share the cloud infrastructure, and a hybrid cloud, composed of multiple clouds, 
which can be private, public, or community, under the control of one or more cloud 
providers, and with more stringent security requirements than a public cloud. 
Similarly, different service models, namely IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service), PaaS 
(Platform as a Service), and SaaS (Software as a Service), entail different 
responsibilities in enforcing security. The security and privacy issues to be addressed 
and the challenges involved can vary in different deployment and service models. For 
instance, a private cloud typically entails more control for the owner at the varying 
levels (applications, platform, and infrastructure) among data owners and providers. 
In this chapter, we highlight security issues that need to be considered when using the 
cloud to offer or enjoy services, which are typically present, thought with possible 
variations, in the different models above. The chapter discusses security aspects that 
are more affected by the cloud paradigm, in particular in relationships to the data 
security lifecycle, reported in Figure 1 (CSA, 2011). Of course, complete protection 
requires also the use of others, perhaps more traditional, security techniques on which 
we do not further elaborate. 
The chapter is organized in two main sections. Section 2 discusses how the classical 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability properties translate in the cloud. Section 3 
presents an overview of the security issues and concerns to be addressed to ensure 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability in such a complex scenario. For each 
identified issue, we provide a description of the problem and challenges to be 
addressed together with possible existing solutions or directions. 
 
2. Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability in the Cloud 
Security problems can be classified with the classical CIA (confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability) paradigm, which in the cloud can be interpreted as follows. 
Confidentiality requires guaranteeing proper protection to confidential or sensitive 
information stored or processed in the cloud. Depending on the requirements of the 
considered scenario, this can relate to any or all of: the data externally stored, the 
identity/properties of the users accessing the data, or the actions that users perform 
over the data. Integrity requires guaranteeing the authenticity of: the parties (users and 
providers) interacting in the cloud, the data stored at external providers, and of the 
response returned from queries and computations. Availability requires providing the 
ability to define and verify that providers satisfy requirements expressed in Service 
Level Agreements (SLAs) established between data owners/users and providers. The 
issues to be tackled, the challenges to be addressed, and the specific guarantees to be  
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Figure'1:'Data'security'lifecycle.'
provided for ensuring satisfaction of the security properties above depend on the 
characteristics of the different scenarios. For instance, in a simple scenario, where an 
individual or a company uses the cloud simply for archival/storage purposes, 
problems to be addressed concern protecting confidentiality or integrity of data in 
storage and assessing satisfaction of Service Level Agreements, also ensuring correct 
enforcement of create and destroy operations. In a more complex scenario requiring 
execution of queries over data (use), the problem arises of executing queries as well 
as guaranteeing confidentiality and integrity of the dynamically computed results. The 
case where not only the owner (or a restricted set of trusted users) accesses the data 
(share) entails further complications such as the need to enforce access control 
restrictions over the data, ensure data integrity in presence of concurrent independent 
operations, and even ensure confidentiality of a user’s actions with respect to other 
users. A further aspect that affects the issues to be addressed and possible applicable 
techniques are the trust assumptions – and consequent potential threats – on the 
providers involved in the storage and processing of the data, which could be fully 
trusted, curious, lazy, or malicious. Fully trusted providers can be assumed in cases of 
private clouds (or portions thereof) under complete and full control of the data owner. 
Curious providers refer to scenarios where the storage or processing involves 
sensitive information (data or actions on them) that should be maintained confidential 
to the providers themselves. Lazy providers refer to scenarios where the storing or 
processing providers might not be considered fully trustworthy for ensuring data or 
computation integrity or for providing the availability promised in the service level 
agreements. Finally, malicious (or byzantine) providers refer to cases where providers 
may intentionally behave improperly in the management, storage, and processing of 
the data, possibly compromising their confidentiality, integrity, or availability (this 
case accounts also for insider threats at the provider’s side). 
 
3. Issues and Challenges 
The discussion in the previous section makes it clear that there is not a one-size-fits-
all solution (not even a one-size-fits-all problem definition). There are instead 
different aspects, with related issues, challenges, and security controls that need to be 
considered and that can find application in different scenarios. In this section, we 
illustrate these issues and challenges, summarized in Figure 2. 
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Issue Description 
Protection of data at rest  Guarantee confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data  
Fine-grained access Enable fine-grained retrieval and query execution on protected data 
Selective access Enable owner-regulated access control and authorization enforcement  
User privacy Support privacy of users accessing data and performing computations 
Query privacy  Support privacy of users’ actions in the cloud 
Query and computation 
integrity  
Enable assessment of correctness, completeness, and freshness of 
queries and computations 
Collaborative query 
execution with multiple 
providers 
Enable controlled data sharing for collaborative queries and 
computations involving multiple providers 
SLA and Auditing Specification and assessment of security requirements to be satisfied by  
providers 
Multi-tenancy and 
virtualization 
Provide confinement of different users data and activities in the shared 
cloud environment  
Figure'2:'Summary'of'cloud'security'issues.'
3.1 Protection of data at rest 
A first basic problem that needs to be addressed when relying on the cloud for storing 
data is to guarantee protection (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability) to the 
stored data themselves. With current solutions, users typically need to completely 
trust the cloud providers. In fact, although cloud providers apply security measures to 
the services they offer, such measures allow them to have full access to the data. For 
instance, Google Docs or Salesforce support encryption of the data both in transit and 
in storage but they also manage the encryption keys, and therefore users do not have 
direct control on who can access their data. Whenever data confidentiality needs to be 
guaranteed even to the provider’s eyes, other solutions have to be considered. 
Solutions for protecting confidentiality in this, honest-but-curious, scenario typically 
require encrypting data before releasing them to the cloud providers (Figure 3(a)). For 
instance, services like Boxcryptor allow a user to encrypt her files locally before 
releasing them to a cloud provider such as Dropbox, Google Drive, and Microsoft 
SkyDrive. Encryption guarantees both confidentiality as well as integrity (as data 
tampering can be easily detected). For performance reasons, symmetric encryption is 
usually adopted. While encryption can be effective in many environments, it brings in 
several complications in scenarios where fine-grained retrieval of data needs to be 
supported (see Section 3.2). For this reason, recent approaches have put forward the 
idea of using fragmentation, instead of encryption, when what need to be maintained 
confidential are the associations among data values, in contrast to the values 
themselves (Ciriani et al., 2010). Fragmentation protects sensitive associations by 
splitting the concerned pieces of information and storing them in separate un-linkable 
fragments.!Fragmentation can be applied in conjunction with encryption or by itself, 
resulting in different approaches (Figure 3(b-d)). In the “two can keep a secret” 
approach (Figure 3(b)), the data owner relies on two independent non-communicating 
providers, each of which stores a portion of the data, as much as possible in plaintext 
form, with encryption applied only to data values that either are sensitive by 
themselves or cannot be stored in the clear at any of the two providers without 
disclosing some sensitive associations. In the “multiple un-linkable fragments” 
approach (Figure 3(c)), only attributes with sensitive values are encrypted, while all 
other attributes are stored in the clear in as many fragments as needed, trying to avoid 
excessive fragmentation. In the “keep a few” approach (Figure 3(d)), nothing is 
encrypted and there is instead the involvement of a trusted party (typically the data 
owner) for storing and processing a limited amount of data that are sensitive by 
themselves or whose visibility would disclose some sensitive associations.  
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Figure' 3:' Protection' of' data' at' rest' with:' encryption' (a),' fragmentation' over' two' independent'
providers' (b),' fragmentation' with' unClinkable' fragments' (c),' and' fragmentation' with' the' owner'
storing'some'of'the'data'
Ensuring integrity and availability of data in storage requires providing the data 
owners/users with the ability to verify that data have not been improperly modified or 
tampered with, and that their management at the provider side complies with the 
service level agreements. Integrity of data can be verified by employing signature 
schemes, where data are digitally signed so to make improper modifications on them 
detectable. Signatures provide a deterministic guarantee of data integrity. Probabilistic 
guarantees can be provided by the use of checks, such as sentinels used in Proof Of 
Retrievability (POR) solutions, which apply to encrypted data, or homomorphic 
verifiable tags used in Provable Data Possession (PDP) solutions, which apply to 
generic datasets. Availability of data in spite of failures or non compliance of 
providers can be guaranteed by employing classical replication techniques distributing 
data at different providers.  
Protection of data entails also ensuring correct destruction of the data at the owner 
demand. The use of encryption under control of the owner can provide such a 
guarantee since possible remaining data copies would be intelligible without the 
proper key (Cachin et al., 2013).  
 
3.2 Fine-grained access to data in the cloud   
Maintaining confidentiality of the data even with respect to the providers storing or 
processing them implies, when data are protected with encryption, that the providers 
cannot decrypt the data for query execution. In applications where fine-grained 
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access, typically query execution, needs to be supported, queries should then be 
evaluated on the encrypted data themselves. There are two lines of approaches for 
providing this ability. The first approach consists in performing queries directly on 
the encrypted data, where such a capability is made possible by specific 
cryptographic techniques (e.g., homomorphic encryption). The main drawbacks of 
these approaches, applicable typically for keyword searches or very basic operations, 
remain the limited kinds of accesses supported and the computational complexity of 
the execution, which make them not applicable in many real life scenarios. Other 
solutions enabling execution of SQL queries directly on encrypted data while 
guaranteeing more support for operations and efficiency rely on different layers of 
encryption, each supporting specific operations. An example is CryptDB (Popa et al., 
2011), where each relation is encrypted at the column level with different onion layers 
of encryption, each supporting the execution of a specific SQL operation. Whenever 
the CryptDB proxy server receives an SQL query, it determines the onion layer 
needed for its execution. If the encrypted data are not already at the required onion 
layer, the proxy sends to the provider the key of the onion layer enabling the provider 
to strip off the other layers and execute the query.  The second approach consists in 
attaching to the encrypted data some metadata (indexes) that are then used for fine-
grained information retrieval and query execution. For instance, in a relational table 
where tuples are encrypted, different indexes can be specified for the different 
attributes on which conditions might need to be evaluated. Indexes should be well 
related to the data behind them, so to be precise and effective for query execution, but 
at the same time should not leak information on such data. Such a protection should 
be guaranteed from static observations (observation of the encrypted and indexed data 
in storage) as well as dynamic observations (observation of the queries in execution 
on such data). Different kinds of indexes have been investigated, including direct 
indexing (providing a one-to-one correspondence between plaintext and index 
values), bucket- or hash-based indexing (providing a many-to-one correspondence 
between plaintext and index values), and flat indexing (providing a one-to-many 
correspondence between plaintext and index values). Other types of indexes have 
been investigated in relation to tree-based data structures, and order-preserving or 
homomorphic encryption solutions, for providing support of range queries or 
aggregate functions. Different approaches to indexes provide different protection 
guarantees as well as different support for, and performance in, query execution. For 
instance, the many-to-one correspondence in bucket and hash-based approaches, 
where multiple plaintext values collide to the same index, and the flat indexing, where 
all different index values have the same number of occurrences, provide better 
protection of the confidentiality of the indexing with respect to direct indexing, at the 
price however of a more complex query process. Also, indexing approaches based on 
order preserving encryption provide support for range queries, but are exposed to 
some information leakage.  
Query execution over encrypted and indexed data typically involves a trusted client 
application translating the plaintext query Q in a query Qp to be sent to the provider 
and query Qc performing some post-processing for decrypting data and removing 
possible tuples originated by collisions in the index function and not belonging to the 
result (Figure 4). 
 
3.3 Selective access to data in the cloud 
In many scenarios access to data is selective, meaning different users (or groups 
thereof) should enjoy different views and accesses over the data. When data are stored  
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Figure' 4:' Query' evaluation' over' outsourced' (encrypted/indexed)' data:' the' user' query' Q' is'
translated' by' a' trusted' client' in' a' query' Qp' to' be' executed' by' the' provider' and' a' query' Qc' to' be'
executed'at'the'client'side'over'Qp’s'result'once'decrypted.'
in the cloud, the problem arises of how to enforce such access control restrictions on 
them. For instance some cloud storage services (e.g., Amazon S3 and Google Cloud 
Storage) support the definition of access control lists for regulating access to data. 
The enforcement of such access control policy is however delegated to the cloud 
provider. In many scenarios this solution is not possible since the access control 
policy, just like the data, might be confidential and therefore should not be disclosed 
to the provider (note also that even authorizations to access data could leak 
information on the data themselves, therefore potentially compromising the protection 
enforced by encryption). Also, outsourcing access control to the cloud requires 
complete trust in the enforcing providers, as data protection would be completely in 
their hands (and providers could collude with users to acquire – and improperly grant 
– unauthorized access to data). On the other hand, having the data owner mediate 
every access request, to ensure only authorized accesses are granted, is clearly 
impractical and inapplicable. A promising approach to delegate access control to the 
cloud while not requiring complete trust in the providers relies on combining access 
control and encryption, that is, encrypt data with different keys, depending on the 
authorizations holding on them. Enforcing access control policies via encryption 
entails some challenges: users should not be required to hold many keys for the 
different resources they can access; at the same time every resource should be 
maintained only once (different replicas encrypted with different keys should be 
avoided as their management would clearly be impractical). This problem can be 
solved by employing key derivation methods, by which users can derive keys from a 
single key assigned to them and public tokens. Access control can then be enforced by 
properly organizing the keys in a hierarchy reflecting authorizations, or better the 
access control lists (ACLs) of resources, where the key corresponding to an ACL 
allows deriving – via one or more tokens – the keys associated with all ACLs that are 
superset of it. This way a user is able to derive, from her key and public tokens, all 
(and only) the keys that are needed to access resources that she is authorized to access 
(see Figure 5). 
Updates to the access control policy can require changing the key with which 
resources have been encrypted, and therefore the need to download the resources from 
the cloud and release a newly encrypted version of them. Such a burden can be  
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Figure'5:'An'example'of'access'control'policy'(1'represents'authorized'accesses)'with'four'users'and'
five'resources'(a)'and'of'key'derivation'hierarchy'enforcing'it:'solid'lines'represent'public'tokens,'
dotted'lines'represent'the'keys'associated'with'users'and'resources'(b).'
avoided by assuming some collaboration from the external providers in enforcing 
policy changes, having the providers apply a further level of encryption, called over-
encryption (De Capitani di Vimercati et al., 2010) in addition to – and on top of – the 
one applied by the owner. To access a resource r (see Figure 6), a user needs to pass 
both the encryption imposed by the provider (SEL, Surface Encryption Layer) and the 
encryption imposed by the owner (BEL, Base Encryption Layer).  
Alternative solutions to enforce access control in the cloud use attribute-based 
encryption (ABE) techniques, possibly combined with other cryptographic techniques 
such as proxy and lazy re-encryption (Yu, Lou, and Ren, 2012). ABE is a public-key 
encryption that regulates access to data according to descriptive attributes associated 
with the data themselves and/or users, and to policies defined over these attributes. 
ABE can be implemented either as Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE) or as Key-
Policy ABE (KP-ABE), depending on how attributes and policies are associated with 
data and/or users.  
 
3.4 User privacy 
In a cloud scenario there might be need to grant access to data to users not registered 
in the system without requiring such users to declare their identity.   
In these scenarios, access control authorizations and enforcement should be based on 
properties of users (in contrast to their identity), typically provided by means of 
attributes within digitally signed certificates. Access control solutions supporting this 
new paradigm are referred to as attribute-based, credential-based, or certificate-
based access control, to stress the departure from identity to consider instead certified 
properties in the access decisions, or privacy-enhanced access control, to stress the 
privacy offered by departing from user authentication. Several proposals have 
investigated different issues to be addressed in this context, including: the language 
for expressing authorizations, the access control engine for evaluating users’ requests, 
the possible dialog and negotiation to be supported between providers and users, the 
support for users’ preferences with respect to properties to be released for acquiring 
services, and possible secondary use restrictions. As for languages, early proposals 
typically investigated the use of logic-based approaches, while later approaches aimed 
at balancing the trade-off between expressiveness of the language and simplicity of 
(and hence ability to maintain control on) the specifications. Different strategies for 
the dialog between users and providers have been investigated, including multi-step 
negotiations. Even in this case, later proposals aimed at balancing the need to 
exchange information to establish trust between users and providers, and the 
simplicity of the dialog to make it suitable for practical applications. As for user 
preferences, while earlier approaches assumed users to regulate release of their  
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Figure' 6:' Protection' of' resources' with' overCencryption.' Every' resource' is' encrypted' first' by' the'
owner' (BEL,' Base' Encryption' Layer)' then' by' the' provider' ' (SEL,' Surface' Encryption' Layer).' A'
resource'is'accessible'(open)'to'a'user'only'if'she'can'pass'both'levels'of'encryption.'!
credentials and properties with an access control approach similar to one adopted by 
the providers, more recent proposals have been investigating solutions specifically 
targeted to users and their natural way of thinking about preferences (Foresti and 
Samarati, 2012). Standards, such as XACML, have also being developed in these 
contexts supporting interoperation of access control policies.  
 
3.5 Query privacy 
In some scenarios what is confidential is not (or not only) data, or users’ 
identities/properties, but also the accesses that users make on such data. In particular, 
confidentiality should be guaranteed, even from the provider’s eyes, with respect to 
the fact that an access aims at a specific data (access confidentiality) or the fact that 
two accesses aim at the same data (pattern confidentiality). Traditional approaches for 
protecting access and pattern confidentiality are based on Private Information 
Retrieval (PIR) techniques that, assuming a database modeled as an N-bit string, 
provide protocols for users to retrieve the i-th bit in the string without disclosing to 
the server the specific bit accessed. In addition to the limitation of such a modeling 
and of the fact that they do not consider data confidentiality, PIR solutions suffer from 
high computational complexity and communication costs. Recent efforts, trying to 
make PIR more practical, have investigated the application of the Oblivious RAM, in 
particular with recent practical ORAM and Path ORAM solutions (Stefanov et al., 
2013), and of a key-based hierarchical and dynamic data structure, called Shuffle 
index (De Capitani di Vimercati et al., 2011b). These proposals protect data 
confidentiality with encryption and protect access and pattern confidentiality by 
dynamically changing (shuffling), at every access, the physical location of the data, 
thus destroying the otherwise static correspondence between data and the physical 
blocks where they are stored. These approaches also employ a cache to maintain 
some data at the client side. Besides caching and dynamic allocation, Path ORAM 
assumes a tree-shaped data structure where nodes can contain, in addition to actual 
blocks, dummy blocks to guarantee that nodes have always the same size. The Shuffle 
index assumes that, at every access, additional fake searches, called cover searches, 
are executed together with the actual target search. Cover searches provide confusion 
to the provider with respect to the targeted block. At every access, the content of the 
blocks accessed (target/cover) and in cache is shuffled and rewritten. This changes 
dynamically the allocation of nodes, and the provider can only observe that some 
blocks have been read and written (Figure 7). By assuming a hierarchical value-based 
organization of the data (B+-tree with encrypted node content and with no pointer 
between leaves), the Shuffle Index is also able to support range-based queries.  
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Figure'7:'Shuffle' index:'original'structure'with'cache/target/cover'and'shuffling'operations'due'to'
an'access'(a);'resulting'structure'at'the'end'of'an'access'(b);'server’s'view:'blocks'written'(gray)'or'
read'and'written'(black)'in'the'access'execution'(c).'
3.6 Query and computation integrity 
In scenarios where queries/computations are performed by providers that are not fully 
trustworthy, the problem arises of providing data owners and/or users with the ability 
to assess that the result returned from a query/computation is correct, complete, and 
fresh. Correctness means that the result has been computed over the original data and 
the query/computation performed correctly. Completeness means that no data is 
missing from the result. Freshness means that the query/computation has been 
performed on the most recent version of the data. Most of the current approaches 
focus on providing guarantees of completeness and correctness, with some proposals 
complementing them with timestamps or periodical refreshing to provide freshness 
guarantees. Current solutions can be roughly classified in two categories: 
deterministic and probabilistic. Deterministic approaches are provided by 
authenticated data structures that, similarly to signature schemes for static data, permit 
to detect integrity violations with certainty. Examples of deterministic approaches for 
correctness/completeness are signature chaining schemas and Merkle hash trees. 
Signature chaining schemas allow the verification of the ordering among tuples and 
can then be used to verify the integrity of range queries where the selection condition 
is based on the attribute on which the signature schema has been applied. Merkle trees 
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and their variations organize data within a tree-based structure over a given attribute 
(e.g., a search key). The result of a query with selection conditions on the attribute 
includes, in addition to the tuples belonging to the! result, a verification object that 
allows the assessment of the integrity of the query (Figure 8). These authenticated 
data structures provide deterministic integrity guarantees but only for queries over the 
specific attribute/s on which the data structure has been organized. Techniques that 
have been applied, individually or in combination, for providing probabilistic 
guarantees include: insertion of fake tuples in the data, which if not retrieved in the 
query result signals an integrity compromise; replication of a portion of the data with 
replicas not recognizable as such, so that the presence of a duplicated data where the 
replica is missing signals an integrity compromise; and pre-computation of tokens 
associated with chosen query results, which allow the verification of the integrity of 
such queries. Probabilistic approaches, as their name says, provide only probabilistic 
guarantees: while the absence of an expected fake tuple or replica signals an integrity 
problem, its presence does not imply the integrity of the result since the providers 
might have just been lucky in not missing any of the checks inserted by the data 
owner. The probability of detecting an integrity compromise typically depends on the 
amount of controls (e.g., fake tuples, replicas inserted, or pre-computed tokens) 
enforced, where the more the control the!higher the guarantees, but also the higher the 
performance overhead imposed for the verification. The involvement of multiple 
providers in the storage or computation complicates the scenario and requires 
devising additional controls. A possible solution to assess integrity of joins computed 
by an untrusted provider over data stored at two trusted storage servers assumes the 
cooperation of the storage servers to insert control information consisting of fake 
control tuples (markers) and duplicate tuples (twins) that if not present in the join 
result signals its incompleteness (De Capitani di Vimercati et al., 2014).  
 
3.7 Collaborative query execution with multiple providers 
Data stored and managed by different cloud providers may need to be selectively 
shared and accessed in a cooperative way. This scenario may see the presence of 
different providers as well as of different data owners. Exchange of data and 
collaborative computations should be controlled to ensure that information is not 
improperly accessed, released, or leaked. For instance, data stored at one provider 
might be released selectively only to specific providers and within specific contexts. 
Some solutions have addressed the specific problem of private and secure multi-party 
computation, which provide the ability of different parties to perform a collaborative 
computation learning only the query results and nothing on the inputs. Along the 
same line are solutions for computing sovereign joins over data, retrieving the result 
of a join operation over different tables, while guaranteeing confidentiality of the 
information not belonging to the join result. Recent approaches have also addressed a 
more general scenario where different parties (data owners or cloud providers) need 
to collaborate and share information for performing a distributed query computation 
with selective disclosure of data. Work has then investigated the problem of 
determining an efficient and safe execution plan for the query computation in which 
different providers collaborate releasing to others the information authorized and 
needed to compute the query result (De Capitani di Vimercati et al., 2011a).  
 
3.8 Service Level Agreement and Auditing 
A Service Level Agreement (SLA) is a contractual agreement that specifies the 
performance and availability guarantees that a cloud provider promises to deliver as  
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Figure'8:'A'Merkle' tree:'every' leave'node' is'a'hash'of'a' tuple,' internal'nodes'are'hashed'over' the'
concatenation'of'their'children.''Colored'node'represent'the'integrity'check'assuming'a'query'with'
result' tuple' t3:' in'gray' the'verification'objects'returned'by' the'provider' together'with' tuple' t3,' in'
black'the'hash'computed'for'verification.''
well as penalties in the case of violations of the SLA. Due to the shared and dynamic 
nature of the cloud, cloud providers have to address several issues related to offering 
and managing SLAs, with different requirements coming from different users. Also, 
while in the past SLAs mainly focused on aspects related to the quality of the services 
offered (e.g., availability, response time, and fault resolution time), today they may 
also include the specification of the security guarantees, such as proofs on: the 
integrity of the stored data, their possession, their handling, or the application of 
specific security mechanisms (e.g., encryption or perimeter protection). In this 
contest, auditability of cloud providers, refers to the ability of users to verify full 
respect of the security guarantees declared in a SLA. Some proposals have presented 
solutions for verifying, for example, whether cloud providers are correctly storing 
data or correctly executing computation-intensive tasks on behalf of the users. In fact, 
lazy providers could delete some rarely accessed data or omit some computations to 
save resources. Some approaches apply Proof of Retrieval solutions as building 
blocks to allow users to verify that their data are: properly secured via encryption, 
intact, and retrievable. The correctness of the result of outsourced computations can 
be verified by applying the techniques for assessing integrity we have discussed 
previously.  
 
3.9 Multi-tenancy and virtualization 
Multi-tenancy refers to the ability to provide computing services to different users by 
using a common cloud infrastructure.  Each user or company (i.e., a tenant of the 
cloud infrastructure) shares computation, memory, network, and storage resources, 
thus reducing the costs and improving the utilization of resources as well as the 
scalability and reliability. A basic mechanism enabling multi-tenancy in the cloud is 
virtualization, which creates a virtual version of, for example, an operating system, a 
storage device, or network resources, within a single physical system. Although 
virtualization brings great flexibility, it also introduces several security concerns that 
may have the hypervisor and/or the resident virtual machines as the main target. The 
hypervisor is a software component whose goal is to create and run the virtual 
machines. A compromised hypervisor can put at risk the confidentiality and integrity 
of the data managed by the virtual machines. Other security concerns can be related to 
the allocation and de-allocation of resources associated with virtual machines. In fact, 
improper leakages can result if the memory allocated to a virtual machine is not 
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properly wiped before being reallocated to another virtual machine. Also, the 
communication, monitoring, modification, and migration of virtual machines can be a 
source of security concerns. In fact, due to the multi-tenant nature of cloud 
environments, there is the risk of improperly leaking information if the virtual 
resources allocated to different users are not perfectly isolated. Other aspects can be 
related to placement of virtual machine instances in the cloud, also supporting 
security constraints imposed by users, such as the request to not allocate given virtual 
machine instances to the same server (Jhawar, Piuri and Samarati, 2012). 
 
4. Conclusions 
With the rapid growth of cloud computing platforms and services, cloud security is 
becoming a key priority for all players (i.e., individuals, companies, and cloud 
providers). In this chapter, we presented an overview of security issues and concerns 
in cloud scenarios, illustrating their impact on the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability properties and describing current solutions and possible challenges and 
directions. 
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